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DEBATE

IMMIGRATION PREEMPTION AFTER
UNITED STATES v. ARIZONA

OPENING STATEMENT
Preemption of State and Local Immigration Laws Remains Robust
KIT JOHNSON†
Many people, frustrated with what they believe to be a failure of the
federal government to police the nation’s borders, have sought to leverage
state and local laws to do what the federal government has not: get tough on
undocumented migrants. The primary stumbling block for these attempts is
federal preemption as the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably
exclusively a federal power.” DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
This June, in a victory for local movements against undocumented
immigration, the Supreme Court held that federal law did not preempt an
Arizona law requiring police to “make a ‘reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest’”
whenever they reasonably believe the person is “unlawfully present in the
United States.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012)
(quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2012)).
The task now falls to lower courts to apply Arizona to the myriad other
state and local laws coming down the pike. The en banc Fifth Circuit is
presently considering whether a Dallas suburb may use a scheme of “occupancy licenses” to prevent undocumented immigrants from living in rental
housing within city limits. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
† Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law; J.D., 2000, University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law. I am very grateful to Professor Eric E. Johnson for his
comments and insights and to Professor Peter Spiro for being game.
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Branch, 675 F.3d 802, (5th Cir. 2012), vacated pending review en banc, 688
F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012). Both the district court and a three-judge panel of
the Fifth Circuit held that the ordinance was preempted. Id.at 806-07, 817.
But the substance and style of the questions asked during the oral argument
en banc suggests that several judges would like to overturn those decisions.
Oral Argument, Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751
(5th Cir. Sept. 19, 2012) (en banc), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/
OralArgRecordings/10/10-10751_9-19-2012.wma. They should, however, affirm.
A bit of background: Farmers Branch was an early leader in local laws
aimed at undocumented immigrants. The city passed three rental housing
ordinances in three years—2006, 2007, and 2008—each with the goal of
keeping undocumented immigrants out of the Farmers Branch rental
housing market. The 2006 ordinance was repealed after a Texas state court
judge enjoined its enforcement for possible violations of the Texas Open
Meetings Act. A federal court enjoined the enforcement of the 2007
ordinance on the grounds that it was preempted by federal law, violated due
process, and was void for vagueness. The city hopes the third time’s the
charm with the 2008 ordinance now before the Fifth Circuit.
The current Farmers Branch ordinance directs the city’s building inspector to “verify with the federal government” whether every noncitizen
occupant of rental housing is “an alien lawfully present in the United
States.” Villas at Parkside Partners, 675 F.3d at 804 (internal citations
omitted). Doing so might seem simple, but in practice, it is not. While the
government can inform the city about the immigration status of a noncitizen, lawful presence is a different, more complex question, and it is one the
Department of Homeland Security has said it cannot or will not answer for
inquiring municipalities. That being the case, under the Farmers Branch
scheme, the determination of lawful presence falls to the city’s building
inspector. And the current inspector in Farmers Branch has admitted, with
admirable candor, that he is ill-equipped to make such a determination. Yet,
under the 2008 ordinance, he must. The determination is crucial because if
an occupant is deemed “not lawfully present,” the ordinance requires the
inspector to revoke the occupant’s “occupancy license.” The license revocation then triggers criminal liability for both the occupant and the landlord if
the occupant does not vacate.
The 2008 ordinance poses obvious and serious equal protection and due
process problems. While equal protection looms large in questions of how
the ordinance will be enforced, due process concerns will likely constitute a
fatal flaw for the scheme. But, unfortunately for opponents of the ordinance, neither of these issues is currently before the Fifth Circuit. The sole
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question presented in the en banc hearing concerns the scope of federal
preemption in the immigration arena.
Given the Fifth Circuit’s focus on preemption alone, supporters of the
Farmers Branch ordinance were likely encouraged by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Arizona. But, while the Court upheld one part of the Arizona
law, the Court also affirmed the continuing viability of immigration
preemption, stating that “[t]he Government of the United States has broad,
undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. As a consequence, the Court held that Arizona
could not make it a misdemeanor for non–U.S. citizens to fail to carry an
alien registration document. Likewise, Arizona could not make it a misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work
in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor.” Id. at 2503 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2928(C)). Nor, under
Arizona, may the state authorize its officers to undertake warrantless arrests
of individuals believed to have committed any public offense making them
removable from the United States. Id. at 2507.
Federal power with respect to immigration is “exclusive” and includes
the authority to determine who should and should not be allowed to remain
in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2006). Thus, state and local
governments may not create their own immigration policies. Arizona, 132 S.
Ct. at 2506. They certainly cannot make their own choices about whether
individuals should be allowed to remain within city limits when those
decisions are based on immigration status.
Farmers Branch argues that its ordinance does not interfere with the
federal removal scheme, but rather “goes to extraordinary lengths” to avoid
entanglement with federal decisionmaking. Brief of Appellant, the City of
Farmers Branch, Texas, on Rehearing En Banc at 31, No. 10-10751 (5th Cir.
Aug. 15, 2012). While Farmers Branch admits that its ordinance provides a
“disincentive” to unlawful presence in the city, it argues that the ordinance
never oversteps the municipality’s valid law-making authority. Id. at 32. Of
course, this is all smoke and mirrors. The Farmers Branch ordinance offers
no mere disincentive. It demands action—by the building inspector to bar,
the landlord to evict, and the resident to leave. In a word, to remove.
Preemption analysis should not depend upon the purpose behind a state
or local law. Nonetheless, it is notable that Farmers Branch has intentionally
entered into the business of immigration lawmaking. According to one of
the city’s 2006 resolutions, Farmers Branch acted because of the federal
government’s failure to deal with the “influx of illegal aliens . . . estimated
in the millions . . . coming in across our most southerly border.” Villas at
Parkside Partners, 675 F.3d at 805. Thus, the application of preemption to
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invalidate the Farmers Branch ordinance is not lawyer-crafted legerdemain
to frustrate a valid municipal purpose. Farmers Branch’s own, external
purpose in ordinance-making invites such analysis.
The city’s motivations go beyond its self-regard as a pint-sized Congress. There is also a strong streak of nimbyism. Members of the city
council have said that the goals of the enactments were to “mak[e] it
difficult for illegal aliens to rent property in the City of Farmers Branch,” to
“sen[d] a message to people who aren’t in the country legally, [that] Farmers Branch is not the place for you,” and, ultimately, to “help reduce the
illegal immigrant population in Farmers Branch.” Id. at 805 n.4, 806.
During oral argument before the Fifth Circuit, one judge questioned
whether housing was “somehow different” from other areas where state and
local regulations governing noncitizens have been permitted, such as
employment and public benefits. Indeed, housing is different, because it
treads closer to the core of the Supreme Court’s concerns about federal
control of immigration. In Truax v. Raich, a case concerning foreigners of
lawful status, the Court reasoned that “to deny to aliens the opportunity of
earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the State would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in
ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.” 239 U.S. 33, 42
(1915). The power to deny “entrance and abode,” the Court said, is like the
power to remove foreign nationals: it is purely federal. Id.
One might counter that this line of reasoning does not support preemption
of the ordinance because Farmers Branch does not seek to repel foreign
nationals generally, only those of “unlawful” status. Yet that line of argument is
self-defeating. The federal government sets immigration policy, whether by
conferring status on individuals or turning up or down the dials of immigration
enforcement. Either way, it is not the business of state or local governments.
Not only does the Farmers Branch ordinance interfere with the federal removal scheme, it also implicates foreign relations in a way the
approved law in Arizona did not. The ordinance demands that foreign
nationals identify themselves to the city and be subject to registration,
investigation, and potentially, expulsion and conviction. Municipal
authority is used to extend legal unwelcomeness to foreign nationals.
Thus, within its city limits, Farmers Branch is pursuing a distinct
foreign relations policy, something it may not do because federal control
of foreign policy is absolute. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that the federal government must be able to speak “with one voice.”
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506-07. There is no room for local interference
because “[e]xperience has shown that international controversies of the
gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or
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imagined wrongs to another’s subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a
government.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941).
There remains the question of how to categorize the particular species of
federal preemption that should be brought to bear against Farmers Branch.
Making such a categorization is complicated by the fact that preemption
doctrine is, in the words of Professor Caleb Nelson, something of “a
muddle.” Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000). The
question is not greatly significant, however, because multiple preemption
theories apply to the 2008 ordinance. The law may be considered subject to
“express preemption” on account of the federal statutory language regarding
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3). The ordinance can also be viewed as
subject to “field preemption” since the scheme of federal regulation governing removal and foreign relations is so pervasive that it allows no room for
states to have their own removal policies. Finally, the theory of “conflict
preemption” may be applied as the ordinance represents as “an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress” in the areas of removal and foreign policy. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67;
see also Nelson, supra, at 226-31 (providing a concise summary of express,
field, and conflict preemption).
Whatever line of preemption analysis applies, the bottom line is the
same. Farmers Branch, like Arizona, “may have understandable frustrations
with the problems caused by illegal immigration,” but that does not entitle
it to “pursue policies that undermine federal law.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at
2510. The Fifth Circuit should affirm the panel’s decision and call the
Farmers Branch ordinance what it is: an unconstitutional usurpation of the
federal government’s exclusive authority over immigration law and policy.
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REBUTTAL
State Action on Immigration (Bad and Good) After Arizona v. United States
PETER J. SPIRO†
Arizona v. United States sounds deeply in the conventional wisdom that
immigration regulation is an exclusively federal domain. But query whether
that reasoning is sound. States and localities must continue to have some
discretion in the immigration context as their officials interact with immigrants in myriad ways. “Subfederal” action unfriendly to immigrants in this
arena will mostly be self-correcting as political and economic pressures are
brought to bear. Perhaps more interesting is the possibility that cities and
states will depart from federal policy in a way that benefits undocumented
immigrants. Arizona establishes a regime of negotiated federalism. While
reaffirming the axiom that immigration policy is an exclusively federal
enterprise, Arizona also allows the federal government to validate increasing
levels of subfederal discretion in the immigration arena.
I agree with Professor Johnson that measures like the Farmers Branch
ordinance currently before the Fifth Circuit are preempted under Arizona.
When it struck down three of the four challenged sections of S.B. 1070, the
Court set a low threshold for preemption. Some immigration restrictionists
hailed the Court’s acceptance of the law’s controversial “papers please”
provision, under which state law enforcement officials must make a determination of immigration status where there is reasonable suspicion to
believe that a person is illegally present in the United States. But the Court
appeared to do so only insofar as the requirement is meaningless on the
ground. It was careful to interpret the “papers please” provision such that it
did not supply a basis for detention by state authorities, and it left the door
open to subsequent as-applied challenges on civil rights grounds. See
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509-10 (2012). The Court struck
down other provisions that criminalized the failure to carry federal alien
registration documents and the pursuit of unauthorized employment as
interfering with federal enforcement priorities. See id. at 2501-08. Unlike
the “papers please” provision, these measures would have had teeth.
So too would the kind of rental occupancy measure contemplated by Farmers
Branch, Hazelton, and other localities. Compare Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of
Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012), vacated pending review en banc, 688
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F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012), with Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.
2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The doctrinal equation in these latter cases is
not as simple as with Arizona’s registration and employment provisions. Both of
those invalidated provisions of S.B. 1070 had clear federal cognates; federal
immigration law regulates both alien registration and unauthorized employment,
and Arizona’s laws had the potential to interfere with each. By contrast, there is
no federal regime regulating the rental of property by undocumented aliens. But
that wouldn’t stand in the way of a preemption finding. Prohibiting rental
occupancy constitutes at least as great a “harassment of some aliens . . . whom
federal officials determine should not be removed” as was confronted by the
Court in Arizona. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2517. The Farmers Branch ordinance may
not undermine a particular strain of federal immigration enforcement, but it
would interfere with federal enforcement as a “harmonious whole.” Id. at 2502
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72 (1941)).
That logic is reinforced by Justice Kennedy’s strong emphasis on the
foreign relations implications of immigration policy. “Immigration policy,”
he observed, “can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations
for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in
this country who seek the full protection of its laws. . . . Decisions of
this nature touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice.” Id.
at 2506-07. By playing on the foreign relations theme, Kennedy telegraphed
the exceptional, hair-trigger preemption standard that applies to other state
activities implicating foreign relations. By situating immigration policy
within the federal government’s broad power over foreign affairs, the Court
reversed its typical preemption analysis, which, as part of a broader federalism agenda, has been increasingly protective of state action. This framing of
the issue bodes poorly for measures like the Farmers Branch ordinance. It
puts a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of preemption.
Justice Kennedy’s approach enjoys a polished judicial pedigree, beginning
with the Court’s 1876 decision in Chy Lung v. Freeman and reinforced in 1941 in
Hines v. Davidowitz (a case striking down a state measure which, like the Arizona
law, imposed a registration–related regime). But the political times have changed.
2012 is not 1876, or even 1941, and Arizona’s immigration-related laws are not
going to lead us down the road to World War III. The dormant foreign affairs
power is only justified insofar as state action results in significant externalities for
the rest of the nation. That may once have been the case; if Arizona did something to offend Mexico, Mexico might retaliate in such a way as to injure, say,
North Carolina, whose citizens had no say in Arizona’s lawmaking. But Mexico
now understands that S.B. 1070 is Arizona’s responsibility alone and is unlikely to
retaliate against the United States as a whole. The new global dynamic eliminates
the need for foreign affairs exceptionalism, as well as its immigration subtheorem.
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Even in Arizona’s wake, there remains significant room for state action
relating to immigration. Nothing in the Arizona decision or the dormant
foreign affairs power constrains the power of the federal political branches
to affirmatively validate state action relating to immigration. In the lead-up
to Arizona, the Court upheld an earlier Arizona law that mandated the
revocation of business licenses for employers who hire unauthorized
workers. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). Whiting
applied a 1986 federal law that expressly preempted state measures relating
to employer sanctions except in the context of business licensing. The
Whiting Court generously interpreted the licensing exception. Id. at 198485. By “preserving to the States the authority to impose sanctions through
licensing laws, Congress did not intend to preserve only those state laws
that would have no effect.” Id. Rather, Congress had included the states in
the enforcement scheme.
The states can manifest hostility to aliens in other ways. For example,
they have discretion under federal law to extend or deny various public
benefits to noncitizens (including legal immigrants). Although not without
controversy, state and local jurisdictions can participate in immigration
enforcement in partnership with the federal government through the 287(g)
program. And even without federal approval, states have other tools in their
anti-immigration tool kit. States get to decide whether to grant in-state
tuition to undocumented immigrants. States appear to have discretion to
decide whether so-called “childhood arrivals” recently granted deferred
action status by the Obama Administration will be eligible for driver’s
licenses and other benefits. And although the “papers please” device may
lack teeth—federal immigration authorities have no obligation to respond to
state-provided information that a particular individual is in the United
States unlawfully—it unequivocally expresses anti-“illegals” sentiment.
The political branches may well expand this room for state action. There
is an understanding (reflected in Justice Kennedy’s opinion as well) that the
burdens of undocumented immigration fall more heavily on some states
than on others. Delegating decisionmaking to the state level may represent
a workable compromise on a polarized issue. In the absence of comprehensive immigration reform legislation, one can expect some level of discretion
to be conceded by the executive branch. When comprehensive immigration
reform comes, it is likely to include provisions giving a longer leash to the
states on certain immigration-related questions.
Even if the leash is let out, the states will not necessarily use it to the
detriment of immigrants, at least if they care about their bottom lines. That
is a key lesson of Arizona’s experience and that of a half dozen other states.
These states have taken an economic hit after passing tough-on-
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immigration laws: lost convention and tourist dollars, crops left to rot in the
fields for want of immigrant labor, and tarnished state brands. If Arizona
had been left to its own devices, there is a good chance that S.B. 1070 would
have been scaled back or repealed. Anti-immigrant legislation is not good
for business in the hyper-competitive global economy, and states have
strong incentives to shy away from anti-immigrant measures that are
anything more than symbolic.
Of course, Arizona’s logic would also seem to apply to state and local
actions that benefit immigrants. Immigration federalism is a two-way
street. Where cities and states have resisted federal immigration enforcement, the federal government has pushed back. The sanctuary
movement of the 1980s and 1990s was snuffed out by federal legislation
forbidding subfederal constraints on cooperation with federal immigration authorities. More recently, prominent subfederal leaders have
pushed back on “Secure Communities,” a federal program that requires
local law enforcement to report the criminal arrests of noncitizens and
has sometimes resulted in the deportation of long-present aliens for
minor crimes. Chicago passed an ordinance mandating nonparticipation
with the program, and California would have followed suit but for a veto
of the so-called Trust Act by Governor Jerry Brown.
One might distinguish immigrant-friendly measures from hostile
ones insofar as the former are unlikely to offend foreign sovereigns.
Nevertheless, the political branches are unlikely to tolerate anything that
looks like outright resistance to immigration enforcement. So long as
they don't go too far, then, the states can roll out something like a
welcome mat by opting for more generous benefits for immigrants. For
instance, several states give the children of immigrants in-state tuition
rates at state colleges and universities.
Combining the good and the bad, there is also the possibility for partnership in advancing immigration reform on a staggered basis. Legislators in
Utah enacted a package that couples enhanced enforcement measures with a
state-initiated guest worker program, under which some undocumented
immigrants would be eligible for state–approved work authorization. The
package followed in the wake of the Utah Compact, a balanced “declaration of
principles,” supported by state civic, religious, and business leaders, to guide
the state on immigration issues. The guest-worker component is almost surely
invalid under Arizona in the absence of federal approval, which to date has
not been forthcoming. Perhaps the second Obama Administration should
give this initiative a closer look, especially if comprehensive immigration
reform remains a nonstarter on Capitol Hill. Legislation at the state level
might even help build momentum for action in Washington.
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In short, in Arizona, the Supreme Court constricted the possibilities for
unilateral state innovation on immigration, both good and bad. That does
not stop the federal government from affirming state discretion. On balance, there is good reason to suspect that state policymaking can and should
benefit immigrants over the long run. State activity relating to immigration
is often decried as creating an unacceptable “patchwork.” But that’s an
inherent feature of federalism, and there’s no obvious reason why immigration should be treated differently than other areas of regulation. In other
strong, federal systems, Canada and Germany included, subfederal actors
are key participants in immigration decisionmaking. Arizona notwithstanding, we would be well served to undertake broader experimentation with
immigration federalism. The Farmers Branch ordinance is likely to be
struck down, but it is not clear that it should be. In any case, cities and
states will continue to be important players on the immigration stage.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
The Benefits of a Tight Leash in a Field of Scapegoats
KIT JOHNSON
I agree with Professor Spiro that when Congress undertakes comprehensive immigration reform, it should give a close look to states’ ideas about
immigration. I say when and not if because, in the week following the
presidential election, representatives from both political parties have
indicated that immigration reform is going to be a priority for the 113th
Congress. As House Speaker John Boehner put it, “[A] comprehensive
approach is long overdue, and I’m confident that [we] can find the common
ground to take care of this issue once and for all.” Jennifer Steinhauer,
Speaker ‘Confident’ of Deal With White House on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/us/politics/boehnerconfident-of-deal-with-white-house-on-immigration.html.
The sudden interest in federal immigration reform is driven, of course,
by the election results and accompanying polls. More than 70% of Latinos
favored President Obama over Mitt Romney, in no small part because of
differences between the candidates on immigration. And 65% of voters,
including 37% of Republican voters, indicated their support for giving
undocumented workers in the United States a path toward legalizing their
immigration status. See Angela Maria Kelley & Ann Garcia, A Post-Election
Look at Immigration Reform, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 9, 2012),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2012/11/09/4467
6/a-post-election-look-at-immigration-reform/.
My disagreement with Professor Spiro lies with the idea that states should
be given a “longer leash” on immigration-related questions to allow “broader
experimentation with immigration federalism.” Spiro, infra, at 108-09.
State and local governments do not have a lot of bankable credit in the
immigration context. To the contrary, they have accumulated well over 100
years of experience in passing largely reactionary anti-immigrant legislation.
There have been many state laws that explicitly restrict the freedom of
noncitizens. Limitations on ownership of land by noncitizens, for example,
can be found in thirty-two states today. Other laws have been facially
neutral but applied to disadvantage noncitizens, such as the 1880 San
Francisco ordinance prohibiting persons from operating a laundry in a
wooden building without a permit (the subject of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
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U.S. 356 (1886)). In this sense, the Farmers Branch ordinance currently
before the Fifth Circuit has a long pedigree.
The impetus for state-based anti-immigrant laws is not hard to discern.
As the Supreme Court quietly acknowledged in Arizona, some states
disproportionately bear the consequences of unauthorized immigration. See
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). And since noncitizens
do not vote, they make convenient scapegoats for politicians, regardless of
whether their presence in a given state or locality truly creates a burden.
Do states and localities sometimes try to enact pro-immigrant legislation? Yes, but such ventures are atypical. Overwhelmingly, state and local
lawmaking is politically lopsided against immigrants. In 2011, when the spike
of anti-immigration fervor led state legislators to introduce 1607 bills and
resolutions relating to immigrants and refugees in all fifty states and Puerto
Rico. Of these, 306 were enacted. The majority of those passed involved
increasing local law enforcement efforts to identify undocumented immigrants, restricting the availability of identification and/or driver’s licenses
for undocumented immigrants, and strengthening obligations for employers
to limit the hiring of undocumented workers—all with an eye toward
getting rid of immigrants. See BROOKE MEYER ET AL., NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JAN. 1–DEC. 7, 2011) 1 (2011), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/2011ImmFinalReportDec.pdf.
And therein lies the problem. States and localities have a strong tendency to pass laws that benefit, or simply appeal to, their voting constituents.
Yet immigration problems are national ones involving a nonvoting population whose protection is a matter of national interest. Thus, these issues
demand national solutions.
The Supreme Court recognized this in Arizona when it emphasized how
state and local laws on immigration could affect foreign relations. See
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506-07. Professor Spiro argues that Arizona’s immigration laws are “not going to lead us down the road to World War III.”
Spiro, infra at 107. Perhaps. But could harsh treatment of Latin American
immigrants undermine the State Department’s ability to gain foreign
cooperation in the drug wars? Could the systematic oppression of Chinese
immigrants push China toward calling in its chits on foreign debt? Could
American inhospitality to refugees erode our moral authority in dealing
with African dictators? To all: plausibly, yes. And the consequences could
be dire for people in every state.
Federal preemption plays an important role in curbing state and local
efforts at regulating immigration. That is as it should be, because the federal
government alone should make decisions about who will be allowed to
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remain in the country. Immigration law must take into account myriad
national issues, including economics, foreign relations, national security,
human rights, and the fundamental cultural question of how America sees
itself in the global community. Nimbyism should not chart our course.

Johnson & Spiro Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)1/22/2013 5:14 PM

2012]

Preemption After Arizona

113

CLOSING STATEMENT
Pivoting to Immigration Federalism
PETER J. SPIRO
Thanks to Professor Johnson for her thoughtful reply. She may have
history on her side: the immigrant experience at the crossroads of federalism
has not always been a happy one. Prop. 187 in California, S.B. 1070 in
Arizona, H.B. 56 in Alabama, and the local ordinances passed by Hazleton
and Farmers Branch have captured the modern understanding of the issue.
Questioning this understanding runs the risk of looking friendly to
restrictionist constituencies whose motives have not always been rightsrespecting. As Professor Johnson puts it, state and local governments do not
have much “bankable credit” in the immigration context. Supra at 111. In
this context, however, past performance may no longer be a predictor of
future results. The tectonics have shifted. If state and local governments are
given space in which to modulate immigration enforcement, there are forces
at play to deter them from degrading immigrant interests.
The key shift is economic globalization, which facilitates the internalization of costs associated with anti-immigrant legislation. In the past, cracking
down on undocumented immigrants may have presented a largely cost-free
proposition for state and local politicians. As Professor Johnson points out,
states and localities have “a strong tendency to pass laws that benefit or
simply appeal to their voting constituents.” Id.
Today, it’s not so clear that passing anti-immigrant legislation will benefit
voting constituencies, even restrictionist ones. A recent Cato Institute study
concluded that while Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and mandatory e-Verify legislation
“succeeded in driving unauthorized immigrants from Arizona . . . they also
succeeded in driving out economic growth,” contributing to declines in the
agriculture and construction industries, and to a depressed housing market in the
state. Alex Nowrasteh, The Economic Case Against Arizona’s Immigration Laws,
CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS, no. 702, Sept. 25, 2012, at 12-13, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA709.pdf. One study pegs Alabama’s losses from
H.B. 56 in the billions of dollars. See SAMUEL ADDY, CTR. FOR BUS. AND
ECON. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF ALA., A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW
ALABAMA IMMIGRATION LAW 1 (2012), available at http://cber.cba.ua.edu/
New%20AL%20Immigration%20Law%20-%20Costs%20and%20Benefits.pdf.
Even before the Supreme Court gutted the Arizona law, other states were
standing down from copycat laws in the face of these rising costs. In Mississippi
and Tennessee (prime candidates for the anti-undocumented immigrant
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bandwagon), a powerful alliance of immigrant advocates and business interests
successfully headed off Arizona-type enactments. Professor Johnson notes that
over fifteen hundred immigration-related bills were introduced in state legislatures last year. Of the two hundred and fifty enacted, the majority were actually
favorable to immigrant interests on such issues as refugee assistance, human
trafficking, immigrant education, and healthcare. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JANUARY-JUNE) (2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/statefed/IMMIG_REPORT_FINALAUG9.pdf.
An exodus of undocumented immigrants accounts for short-term economic losses as it constricts the labor supply. But a tarnished state brand is
also part of the picture, which poses the threat of redirected foreign investment. Among those first arrested under the “papers please” provision of
H.B. 56 in Alabama was a German Mercedes-Benz executive, an episode
unlikely to help Alabama the next time it is courting foreign manufacturers
for future multibillion-dollar undertakings in the state. (One of Germany’s
major newspapers sarcastically recounted a similar story involving a Honda
executive visiting from Japan who was briefly jailed even though he had his
passport in hand: “Maybe the Alabama police couldn’t make anything out
of the Japanese characters.” Eva C. Schweitzer, Latinos Trauen Sich Nicht
Mehr in die Kirche, DIE ZEIT ONLINE (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.
zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2011-12/alabama-auslaendergesetz.) In the
wake of S.B. 1070, the Mexican government issued a travel advisory for its
nationals in Arizona warning that “every Mexican citizen may be harassed
and questioned without further cause at any time.” Secretería de Relaciones
Exteriores, Travel Alert (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.sre.
gob.mx/csocial_viejo/contenido/comunicados/2010/abr/cp_121eng.html. As
the head of Tucson’s Convention and Visitors Bureau reported after a
recent trade mission to Mexico, “Arizona’s reputation after passage of SB
1070 . . . [is] negatively impacting Mexican investment in Arizona.”
Brent DeRaad, Fostering Trade and Tourism Relations with Mexico, TUCSON
BUSINESS JOURNAL (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.insidetucsonbusiness
.com/news/inside_business_travel/fostering-trade-and-tourism-relationswithmexico/article_42a5eb50-fdd7-11e1-b97c-001a4bcf887a.html. See also Danielle Kurtzleben, Arizona Businesses Hope to Put SB 1070 Behind Them, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 25, 2012), http://www.usnews .com/
news/articles/2012/06/25/arizona-businesses-hope-to-put-sb-1070-behind-them.
It is no surprise that the harm is targeted at Arizona and not the United
States as a whole. Mexican and other foreign policymakers have a sophisticated understanding of U.S. politics and constitutional structure. They
know that when Arizona or Alabama enacts a misguided immigration

Johnson & Spiro Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)1/22/2013 5:14 PM

2012]

Preemption After Arizona

115

measure, the state is responsible and there is often little the federal government can do about it. Mexico denounced S.B. 1070, but that denunciation was directed at the state, not the federal government. When Mexican
President Felipe Calderón paid a state visit to Washington in May 2010, he
and President Obama expressed united opposition to the measure.
To answer Professor Johnson’s question, then, to the extent the consequences of such measures are dire, they are likely to be dire for the acting
state or locality, not the United States as a nation. That reality erodes the
foundation of the broad preemption doctrine of cases like Chy Lung, Hines,
and Arizona itself. To the extent that foreign responses are targeted at
acting states, those states will suffer the consequences, not the rest of us.
Targeted retaliation raises the probability of self-correction. Even if the
states were given free rein, in other words, we would see very few enacting
consequential anti-immigrant measures. And those that would enact such
laws would be unlikely to keep them for very long.
But before we try to stamp out subfederal policymaking altogether, consider the costs. If immigrant interests alone could dictate immigration
reform, it might make sense to stamp out subfederal discretion. But those
interests are not the only ones that will govern when Congress takes up
comprehensive immigration reform in the new year. Even if the Republican
Party’s presidential nominee suffered because of his views on immigration,
it’s not so clear that GOP House members did. Ensconced in safe districts,
many of them are more anxious about primary challenges from the right
than about winning over Hispanic voters. They will have to be dragged into
immigration reform, and they will not sign off on any package that does not
include enforcement-related provisions.
Validating state and local co-activity on the enforcement side might
suffice to buy off restrictionist interests—a way for Republican legislators to
deliver on their promises to their restrictionist constituencies without
taking comprehensive reform down with them. (There is already a “junior
varsity” version of this kind of trade in place in the so-called 287(g) program, under which states and localities can be deputized to undertake
enforcement under federal supervision.) See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, IMMIG. AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/
287g.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2013.) In the long run, states and cities won’t
take advantage of the discretion Congress affords them very often—or for
very long—now that the costs are clear. By making federalism a part of
immigration reform, and by letting restrictionists blow off a little steam in
the process, Congress and the courts could help seal an immigration deal
that better serves immigrant interests. At the same time, assimilating a
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place for subfederal discretion would validate pro-immigrant local experimentation that could inform national reform efforts. By losing a battle here
and there, pro-immigrant reformers might win the war.
The Fifth Circuit will surely stick with the foreign affairs reasoning of
Arizona in striking down the Farmers Branch ordinance at issue in Villas Partners.
But this will hardly be the last chapter in the story of immigration federalism.
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